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Control, Learning, and Resistance
Michael Newman
University of Technology, Sydney, Australia
Abstract: This paper argues that learning can be a tool for social and political change. It proposes a
theoretical framework for educators and learners living out part or all of their lives in struggle. And it
examines a moral dilemma for educators who see learning as indivisible from action.
Social Control
We are all of us subject to social control, be it con-
trol by custom and convention, legislation, the
courts, publicity, technology, our friends or the
schoolyard bully. In a middle-class family in a de-
veloped country like Australia, for example, the
children are kept in line by the parents, who use
subtle and not so subtle forms of control ranging
from personal example to persuasion to sanctions to
physical restraint that may border on violence. The
parents in their turn are kept in line by the legal,
social and moral responsibilities that come with
having children and by the emotional, physical and
economic demands made by the children them-
selves.
For the purposes of this paper I want to identify
and discuss three interrelated forms of social con-
trol – physical force, institutional control and con-
trol by ideas. By singling these out and examining
the ways they “fold over” into each other, we can
begin to understand how we are severely con-
strained in various aspects of our lives, and how we
can be made to behave in particular ways.
People are controlled by physical force. We are
pushed around, and we can push others around. We
take a child by her shoulders and shake her. There
is domestic violence and rape. A street gang men-
aces us. We lock up boat people. An oligarchy em-
ploys torture, and murder by roving hit squads. One
country invades another. In a sense, physical force
is easy to identify, and easy to understand. But so-
cial control by physical force rarely occurs sponta-
neously. Behind most manifestations of physical
force is an organisation – a ministry of health, po-
litical party or corporation, a family, that street
gang, the tactical response group of the police, a
government … In these cases, physical force is an
expression of institutional control.
Institutional control encompasses both coercion
and consent. All of us submit to institutional con-
trol, and in many cases do so willingly. We give up
a range of freedoms in exchange for the member-
ship, services and security those institutions pro-
vide. We abide by the rules of the local sports club
in order to use the club’s facilities. We run with a
gang in return for a sense of belonging. We meet
the requirements of our employment in return for a
wage or a salary. We follow the educational paths
set by schools, colleges and universities in return
for qualifications. We submit to the laws of the land
in return for the services and security the govern-
ment and bureaucracies provide us. Institutional
control is everywhere.
Physical force and institutional control are inti-
mately related. Some institutions, such as the penal
system, a health department and the education sys-
tem, make overt use of physical force in the form of
detention and incarceration. They lock people up.
Other institutions make use of the threat of physical
force. We keep up our re-payments to the bank for
the loan on a house out of a justified fear that we
will be evicted if we do not. Physical force in actu-
ality or in the form of menace underpins many so-
cial relationships. And since social relationships are
formalised in institutions, such as the family, the
club and the workplace, we can argue, as Foucault
(1973) does, that institutions are structured em-
bodiments of physical force.
The third kind of social control is control by
ideas. Just as physical force and institutional control
fold over into one another, so control by ideas folds
over into institutional control. Institutions are made
up of groupings of people, procedures, and prop-
erty. But they are also constructed on sets of values
and ideologies, which those institutions espouse,
promote, and in some cases seek to make ascendant.
If a social class or group succeeds in making its
ideas and values the dominant ones in society then
that class or group achieves hegemonic control. Its
ideas become embedded in institutions, such as
public utilities, private corporations, the churches
and the education system, which form part of the
superstructure of the state. The ideas and values
become uncontested, accepted as common sense
and therefore in need of neither justification nor
explanation. In this form of social control, the ma-
jority accepts as normal what is in the interests of a
minority. Control is achieved not through coercion
but by consent (Gramsci, 1971). If developers can
get people who are living in the path of a proposed
freeway to say: “You can’t stand in the way of pro-
gress”, then they do not need the courts or the po-
lice to move the occupants out of their houses. The
occupants will move of their own accord.
Learning
As adult educators we have a role in helping our-
selves and others learn about social control, and
about the strategies we can use to combat unwanted
expressions of that control. If we accept this role,
we are using learning as a tool in social and polit i-
cal struggle.
The three kinds of social control tie in with the
“tripartitions” that recur in critical theory. Haber-
mas, for example, examines human interaction in
terms of subject-object, subject-subject, and sub-
ject-to-itself; identifies the modern value spheres of
science, ethics and self-expression; and distin-
guishes between the objective, social and subjective
worlds (Dallmayr, 1996). To identify the kinds of
learning we might pit against different kinds of so-
cial control, it makes sense to go to adult educators
like Mezirow (1991) and Welton, (1995) who draw
on critical theory. These adult educators have inter-
preted Habermas’ (1972) discussion of “knowledge
constitutive interests” and promoted what we can
now call “a critical theory of adult learning.” In
keeping with Habermas’ tripartitions, this theory
postulates three domains of learning—instrumental,
interpretive, and critical.
Instrumental learning enables us to control our
environment, to do a job, to move and build things,
and to manage people when we think of them as
functions and part of the physical world. In this
domain we learn about cause and effect, and solve
problems by commonplace logic. As adult educa-
tors working in this domain, we will help ourselves
and our learners acquire skills and information to
deal with practical matters and to use material
structures and systems to resist or bring about
change. In the objective world, in the value sphere
of science, in our subject-to-object relations, we
will pit instrumental learning against physical forms
of control.
Interpretive learning helps us understand the
human condition. It is the learning that focuses on
what people are and how they relate, on symbolic
interaction and the social construction of meaning.
In this domain we solve problems through dis-
course, through reflection and insight, and by
seeking consensus. As adult educators working in
this domain, we will help ourselves and our learners
understand the way people construct institutions,
and how they communicate and give meaning to
their social lives. We will help ourselves and our
learners use these understandings to resist or bring
about change. In the social world, in the value
sphere of ethics, in our subject-to-subject relation-
ships, we will pit interpretive learning against in-
stitutional control.
Critical learning helps us identify the assump-
tions and values that constrain the way we think,
feel and act. It helps us understand what “makes us
tick.” It helps us strive for a meta-awareness in
which we are not only more acutely aware of our-
selves and of the world around us, we become
aware of our awareness. In this domain we address
problems by adopting a form of self-reflection
which may transform our ways of thinking, feeling
and acting, and so may transform our being. Critical
learning is a political act. It helps us see through
ourselves and so become better at seeing through
others. It helps us separate out “truth” from “ideol-
ogy,” and understand how our social, cultural and
political contexts have shaped our thinking. It helps
us understand how others may try to shape our
thinking for us, and so makes us much less easily
fooled. In the subjective world of ideas and belief,
in the value sphere of self-expression, in our sub-
ject-to-itself relation, we will pit critical learning
against hegemonic control.
Most manifestations of social control will be a
mix of coercion, different kinds of institutional
authority, and various attempts to influence peo-
ple’s thinking. Learning in opposition to unwanted
social control in its turn will be a mix of the instru-
mental, interpretive and critical. But the framework
I have presented allows us to make choices about
the kinds of educational response we might make.
So, when the police charge picketing workers dur-
ing a lawful strike (as they did recently at Pilbara in
Australia), in the immediate aftermath of the charge
the union educator will want to help the picketers
learn how best to protect themselves from the ba-
tons, and how to form more effective human barri-
ers. With a little more time in hand, the educator
will want to provide information on workers’ rights
in case of arrest, and instruction and practice in the
skills needed to organise and insist on those rights.
And only when there is ample time and no threat of
imminent attack will the educator and picketers be
able to discuss how they might change the values of
a society which espouses the principle of fairness
yet employs the police to attack ordinary working
people.
Action
Learning of the kind I am discussing is bound up in
action, and the educator (when one is identifiable)
is an activist. The educator in the example above is
a member of the union and acting in solidarity with
the picketers. The coordinator of a women’s refuge
working with victims of domestic abuse will iden-
tify with the women, may have experienced domes-
tic abuse herself, and will be anything but neutral in
the kinds of learning she encourages. These adult
educators not only help people learn from their ex-
perience. They help them decide on action. To the
framework of social control and learning, therefore,
I want to add a taxonomy of action, upon which the
educator can draw in the design and provision of
learning, and which she or he can offer to the learn-
ers.
McAllister (1992) and Dalton (1996) talk of
“participation” in the affairs of the state, and use
terms such as “conventional” and “unconventional”
participation, and “legal,” “semi-legal,” and “radi-
cal protest.” I am drawing on their ideas but will
collapse their different forms of participation and
protest into three kinds of action; and call them
“conventional,” “confrontational,” and “violent”
action.
Conventional action enables us to participate di-
rectly and peaceably in the affairs of our commu-
nity, society and state. It involves activities such as
voting, taking part in election campaigns as party
members or campaign workers, entering into com-
munal activity, making contact with politicians and
officials through letter-writing, email, phone and
meetings, organising petitions and lobbying, and
engaging in consumer boycotts, lawful demonstra-
tions and lawful strikes. In this kind of action the
people involved are intent on changing policy and
procedures within the existing structures, and not
with altering the structures themselves. Middle-
class people might take to the streets to protest gov-
ernment changes to the public education system, but
they are not challenging the existing order, of which
in many other respects they are a part. Indeed these
kinds of modern demonstration are often carefully
managed, with people being bussed to pre-arranged
meeting points and kept in order by marshals pro-
vided by the protesting organisations themselves
(Dalton, 1996, p. 68).
Confrontational action is what it says. It takes on
those in control more openly and directly, and is
more “in your face.” It will involve action designed
to disrupt, such as invading a meeting, blockading a
road, holding demonstrations which have not been
coordinated with the police and the local council,
occupying buildings, and going ahead with a strike
that has been decreed unlawful by the authorities.
So environmental activists, for example, will picket
a uranium mine, block an underwater outlet from a
chemical works, and dump waste outside a com-
pany headquarters. In many countries people in-
volved in confrontational action tread a fine line
between action which will result in prosecution and
action which, although technically illegal, will not
be prosecuted to the full extent of the law. Activists
may occupy a building not knowing whether the
police will arrest or simply eject them.
Violent action involves damage to property and
violence against people. So the students or workers
in some countries take to the streets, and literally do
battle with the police or armed services. Taking
such action involves flagrantly breaking the law, or
confronting authorities who will offer little leniency
if the activists are detained. Taking such action is
physically dangerous, and involves stepping across
both legal and moral boundaries.
The three kinds of action I have described cor-
relate loosely with Harbermas’ tripartitions. We can
see that violent action in its simplest form relates to
the physical and objective worlds. Successful con-
frontational action is premised on an understanding
of institutions and their procedures and so relates to
some significant extent to the social world. Con-
ventional action is commonly aimed at changing the
thinking of people and effecting changes in policy,
and so relates to the world of ideas, and underlying
values and assumptions. A framework made up of
forms of social control, forms of learning and forms
of action emerges to which the activist adult edu-
cator can refer in the process of responding to the
needs and interests of learners involved in struggle.
Moral Responsibility
I have left the moral problem to the end. Can we
really envisage helping learners plan for and engage
in violent action? Violence against people is repug-
nant. Yet violence occurs. Thugs, militias and gov-
ernment forces wage campaigns of terror in Timor,
Kosovo, and Chechnya. People are exploited, some
killed or maimed, in countries where there is little
legal protection in the workplace. A gay person is
bashed on a city street. A child is abused behind the
closed doors of a suburban house. It would seem a
denial of our own morality not to consider every
possible form of response.
An activist friend talked about how, in a par-
ticular district of a particular country, it was virtu-
ally accepted practice that the owner of a clothing
factory and his sons raped women in their
workforce. “Why,” he asked “when there is vio-
lence against us it is all right, but when we consider
violence in return we are condemned?” Earlier I
asked why the police at Pilbara used force in sup-
port of employers and abandoned their responsibil-
ity to protect the workers. During a campaign
against the closure of a factory in the US, a union
activist exclaimed: “There must be a way to get the
National Guard on our side!” (California Newsreel,
1978).
Is it not possible to use violence in the interests
of good? This was the challenge issued by Nelson
Mandela in 1964 at the Rivonia trial when he ex-
plained to his prosecutors how he and his supporters
had moved from lawful protest to sabotage in their
struggle against the apartheid policy of white South
Africa (Mandela, 1994). Speculation about violence
is not out of place in the world of the adult educa-
tor. We already teach violence. In some conven-
tional adult education institutions there are courses
in self-defence which teach aggressive responses to
even the hint of an attack.
I have no easy answer to this collection of chal-
lenges. However, I argue that we need to ask ques-
tions, point to precedents, and tell stories. Horton
talked of encounters with hired killers, of the mur-
der of a union activist friend, and of helping a group
of strikers decide whether or not they would kill the
killers (1990). Foley tells of activists who, in an
otherwise non-violent anti-logging campaign, broke
ranks and took action in a way that endangered the
lives of the loggers. The actions of these mavericks
swung the campaign in the environmentalists’ fa-
vour (Foley, 1991). In a recent book I recount the
story of a friend who used educational and indus-
trial action to combat the use of child labour. At a
crucial moment, when the release of a number of
children from their virtual slavery was under threat,
my friend’s comrades kidnapped the employer’s
son. They used the child as a bargaining counter to
get the campaign back on track (Newman, 1999).
By asking questions, identifying precedents and
telling stories we can provide activist learners with
a store of discussion, examples, and other people’s
experiences to draw upon. We can help them do
their thinking beforehand. By presenting them with
the framework of social control, learning and ac-
tion, we can offer them choices. And because these
choices extend to and include violent action, we
will be confronting them and ourselves with an
ethical dilemma. We will be adding a profoundly
moral element to our teaching and learning.
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